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IS THE SUPREME COURT’S PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER TEST
OVERLY AMBIGUOUS? AN EMPIRICAL TEST
Jason D. Reinecke*
The prophesies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, are what I mean by the law.1
INTRODUCTION
Few, if any, patent law doctrines have undergone as radical a change in recent
years as patentable subject matter. In four cases handed down between 2010 and
2014, the Supreme Court articulated a new two-step patent eligibility test that
drastically reduced the scope of available patent protection for software and many
life sciences inventions.2 The first step is to determine whether the patent claims are
directed to a law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea.3 If so, the claim is
only patent-eligible under step-two if it contains an “inventive concept” sufficient to
transform the unpatentable law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea into
patent-eligible subject matter.4 Because this test directly relates to the permissible
scope of patent protection in two industries that comprise a sizeable portion of the
U.S. economy, it should come as no surprise that the test is highly controversial.5

*
© 2019 Jason D. Reinecke. Stanford Law School, J.D. 2018. A draft of this Article
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Professors Dan E. Ho, Mark A. Lemley, and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette for their valuable
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in statistics candidate Azeem Zaman for discussing statistical methods with me. Finally,
thanks to participants at the Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property Colloquium at Case
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1
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
2
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
3
Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 215–17.
4
Id.
5
Commentators and even members of the Supreme Court have expressed concern
about the incentive effects of these recent rulings on these two fields, leading one researcher
to discuss the nonpatent innovation incentives that are provided in the biomedical and
software fields. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent
Innovation Incentives, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1115 (2015).
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Scholars have described the test as, among other things, “a foggy standard
cloaked as a rule,”6 “too philosophical and policy based to be administrable,”7 a
“crisis of confusion,”8 “rife with indeterminacy,”9 and one that “forces lower courts
to engage in mental gymnastics.”10 Former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit Paul
Michel has described the standard as “too vague, too subjective, too unpredictable
and impossible to administer in a coherent, consistent way in the patent office or in
the district courts or even in the federal circuit.”11 Others have been even more
colorful describing their feelings toward the new rule.12 For instance, Gene Quinn,
a patent attorney and founder of a popular legal blog,13 stated that rather than
continuing to use the Supreme Court’s new two-step test, “[w]hy don’t we just tie a
rope around the necks of the inventors and see if they float? Such an approach would
be almost more enlightened than the hide the ball test we have now. At least we’d
all know the rules!”14
These criticisms are based on anecdotal and experiential evidence. This Article
brings more systematic evidence into the debate by providing the results of an
6

Michael Risch, Nothing Is Patentable, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 45 (2015).
Dennis Crouch, Eligibility: Explaining the IPO Legislative Proposal, PATENTLYO
(Feb. 9, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/02/eligibility-explaining-legislative.html
[https://perma.cc/JX8G-SSEL].
8
David O. Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2149, 2164
(2017).
9
Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold into Lead: How Patent Eligibility
Doctrine is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 939, 941
(2017).
10
Annal D. Vyas, Alice in Wonderland v. CLS Bank: The Supreme Court’s Fantastic
Adventure into Section 101 Abstract Idea Jurisprudence, 9 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 2
(2015). See also Brief of 19 Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnosis, Inc. et al. (2016) (No. 15–1182) (detailing
how the Supreme Court’s test for patent eligibility suffers from both legal indeterminacy and
over-restrictiveness in application). To be clear, while the test is criticized for being difficult
for courts to administer, the new section 101 jurisprudence is not without its supporters on a
broader scale. See, e.g., Brian J. Love, Why Patentable Subject Matter Matters for Software,
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 1 (2012).
11
Gene Quinn, Judge Michel Says Alice Decision ‘will create total chaos,’
IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/08/06/judge-michel-saysalice-decision-will-create-total-chaos/id=50696/ [https://perma.cc/FLF8-EKV4] (quoting
former Chief Judge Paul Michel).
12
An attorney from Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP wrote a witty satire on the
new patentable subject matter rule. See Darin Gibby, The Abstract Swing: Major League
Problems in Patent Law, JDSUPRA (May 17, 2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
the-abstract-swing-major-league-59124/ [https://perma.cc/X5TV-W4Z6]. Thanks to Darin
Gibby for sending this my way after taking my survey.
13
Gene Quinn, IPWATCHDOG, http://www.ipwatchdog.com/people/gene-quinn-3/
[https://perma.cc/RP28-8KP4] (last visited Nov. 5, 2018).
14
Gene Quinn, It Is Time to Define the Term ‘Abstract Idea,’ IPWATCHDOG (May 18,
2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/05/18/time-define-term-abstract-idea/id=83393/
[https://perma.cc/XER3-SY6E].
7
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empirical study conducted via survey that tests the clarity of the new two-step test
in the software field. In particular, the 231 patent attorneys who responded to the
survey received five software patent claims randomly selected from a population of
fifty and were asked to predict how courts would rule regarding subject matter
eligibility.15 The population of fifty software claims comprised district court
patentable subject matter pleading-stage decisions issued between the Federal
Circuit’s influential McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc.16 decision on
September 13, 2016 and April 19, 2017 when case collection began (a total time
frame of just over seven months).
The results suggest that while the test is likely not a beacon of absolute clarity,
it is also not completely amorphous. For example, patent prosecutors (attorneys who
write patents)17 correctly identified how courts ruled 67.3% of the time. Patent
litigators fared much more poorly, only correctly identifying court outcomes 59.7%
of the time. Interestingly, patent litigators varied significantly in their inferential
abilities. This means that some groups of patent litigators were much better than
59.7% at predicting court outcomes, and some were worse—with the difference
being much more than one would expect due to chance alone.
Although patent litigators fared more poorly, I am not convinced that patent
prosecutors are inherently better than litigators at applying the two-step test. The
attorneys made quick eligibility decisions for the survey. As discussed in more detail
below, I believe that litigators are just worse at making quick eligibility decisions,
and the discrepancy between litigators and prosecutors would be reduced or
eliminated if the attorneys spent more time making their decisions and had access to
more information. If this inference is correct, then I think it’s a mistake to read too
much into the litigators’ poor performance—they just needed more time and
information.
For many respondents—patent prosecutors and some litigators—the new test
for patentable subject matter seems less unpredictable than commentators have
suggested. These results are particularly promising considering (1) attorneys only
received the patent claim and were not given other highly relevant information such
as the patent specification, priority date, and prior art; (2) more than 57% of
respondents spent an average of less than one minute analyzing each claim; and (3)
the new two-step test was only recently handed down and has had little time to
establish itself.
Indeed, numerous attorneys indicated in the comments that they believed they
would have done a much better job had they been able to review the specification.
15

A version of the test is available for readers to try at the following link: https://stan
forduniversity.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_efVRMDNDTrHUNxj [https://perma.cc/P59CKBM8].
16
837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
17
My survey focused on patent prosecuting attorneys. I did not send my survey to patent
agents—individuals who have passed the patent bar and can prosecute patents but have not
attended law school and have not been admitted to a state bar. See Who Can Take the Patent
Bar Exam, IPWATCHDOG, https://www.ipwatchdog.com/patent-bar-exam/patent-barqualifications/ [https://perma.cc/PY7A-TW55] (last visited Feb. 28, 2019).
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Furthermore, the results themselves suggest that attorneys would have been more
successful predictors had they been given the claim’s priority date. Participating
attorneys were much better at predicting which claims were eligible—and worse at
predicting which claims were ineligible—as the patent claim’s priority date became
more recent. Attorneys also exhibited a strong ineligibility bias on the claims with
the earliest priority dates that went away on the claims with the later priority dates.
These correlations are likely due to the fact that patent eligibility often turns on an
inquiry that depends on time: whether the patent claims are directed to something
inventive or to conventional and well-known techniques. The earlier claims
comprise older technology that is inherently going to appear to be more patentineligible to any attorney absent information about the claim’s priority date.
The results provide two more important observations. First, the results show
that the claims vary widely with respect to clarity (much more than due to chance
alone)—that is, attorneys were much better at correctly identifying court outcomes
on some types of claims than on others. This finding remained even after controlling
for priority date, which suggests that the new two-step test may be clearer for certain
types of claims than for others. Second, patent attorneys did not generally agree with
each other on the eligibility of the claims any more than with the courts, which
suggests that judges are not misapplying the law due to lack of patent expertise.
The results clearly show that the two-step test is not wholly ambiguous or as
impossible to administer as some commentators have suggested. If patent
prosecutors can correctly predict court outcomes over two-thirds of the time after
spending less than one minute analyzing merely one piece of the puzzle, the twostep test is clearly not impossible to administer coherently.
However, while the results show that the two-part test is not wholly ambiguous,
this Article leaves to the readers to decide whether the results confirm or dispel their
belief that the test is too difficult to administer from a social welfare perspective. I
believe the social welfare implications suggested by the results are ambiguous for
two reasons. First, it’s unclear just how much better attorneys would have performed
had they had more time to make their decisions and had they been able to make their
decisions after reviewing all the relevant information. Indeed, the results suggest
that attorneys would have performed significantly better. However, this cannot be
confirmed without more research. Second, it’s unclear how much certainty is
sufficient certainty. Commentators will certainly disagree on how much certainty is
“enough,” and I do not wish to attempt to make that determination.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I begins by discussing the Supreme
Court’s new two-step patent eligibility test as it relates to software inventions and
how that test has been administered by district courts and in the Federal Circuit. Part
I concludes by highlighting the widespread criticism the rule has received for being
too unpredictable. Part II describes the empirical study conducted to test this
criticism. Part III provides and analyzes the results of the empirical study.
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I. SECTION 101 PATENT ELIGIBILITY
Part I.A begins by discussing the new two-step patent eligibility test as it relates
to software, including how that test has been applied by the federal courts. Part I.B
proceeds by highlighting the widespread criticism the rule has received for being
difficult to administer.
A. The New Two-step Patent Eligibility Test
Section 101 of the Patent Act permits patent protection for any “process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”18 In spite of this all-encompassing
language, courts have “long held that this provision contains an important implicit
exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable.”19
The application of this implicit exception to software inventions “has a long
and tortured history.”20 In the 1970s, it appeared as though the Supreme Court would
not grant patent protection to software.21 But in 1981, the Court granted protection
to novel software because that software was used to operate a physical machine.22
Lower courts gradually did away with requiring software to be tied to a machine in
the 1980s and 1990s23 and instead began regularly upholding the patentability of
software inventions.24 In 1998, the Federal Circuit completely ousted any
requirement that software be tethered to a machine, opting instead for a prosoftware-patent rule that did not depend on implementation, but rather on whether
the invention produced “a useful, concrete and tangible result.”25

18

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018)
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
20
Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1317 (2011). This
history is briefly discussed in the article. See id. at 1317–19. For a more complete discussion
of the evolution of the patentable subject matter doctrine, see PETER S. MENELL ET AL.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 277–314 (2017); Peter S.
Menell, Forty Years of Wandering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land:
Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its
Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1292–1305 (2011); Joshua D. Sarnoff, PatentEligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 63–84 (2011);
Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms
and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1032–98 (1990).
21
See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63, 65, 71–72 (1972).
22
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187, 191–93 (1981).
23
See Lemley et al., supra note 20, at 1318; see also Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley,
Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (2001).
24
See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544–45 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
25
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
19
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After the Federal Circuit’s 1998 ruling, section 101 claims against software
patents remained a “dead letter” for over a decade26 until 2010 when the Supreme
Court decided Bilski v. Kappos,27 its first of four patentable subject matter rulings in
four years.28 Three of these rulings relate to software inventions and will be
discussed in turn.29
In Bilski, the Supreme Court found that the asserted patent was patent ineligible
subject matter.30 The Court reasoned that the patent was directed only to “the basic
concept of hedging,” which is an unpatentable “abstract idea” because it is “a
fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.”31
Providing patent protection to an abstract idea, with nothing more, would allow the
patentee to “pre-empt use of [the basic and long-standing concept of hedging risk]
in all fields.”32 Furthermore, the claims provided nothing beyond the basic idea of
hedging risk aside from other “well-known . . . techniques.”33 In finding the patent
claims directed to ineligible subject matter,34 Bilski helped establish the modern twostep test espoused more clearly in Alice35 and Mayo.36
1. Alice and Mayo: The Modern Two-step Test
In Alice and Mayo, the Supreme Court articulated the current two-step test that
governs patent eligibility for software patents.37 The test first questions whether the
patent claims are directed to a patent ineligible law of nature, natural phenomena, or
abstract idea.38 If so, the claim is only patent-eligible if it contains an “inventive
concept” sufficient to “transform” the unpatentable law of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.39
The Court reasoned that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
are the “building blocks of human ingenuity,”40 and “monopolization of these tools
through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would
26

See Lemley et al., supra note 20, at 1318.
561 U.S. 593 (2010).
28
Supra note 2.
29
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
The Myriad decision does not strongly relate to software inventions and thus will not be
discussed.
30
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. at 611–12.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 612.
34
Id.
35
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
36
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
37
Alice Corp., 573 U.S. 208 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
38
Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216–17; Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 72–73, 77.
39
Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216–18, 221; Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 72–
73, 77.
40
Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217; see also Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 71.
27
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tend to promote it.”41 Acknowledging, however, that “all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or
abstract ideas,”42 the Court noted that “an invention is not rendered ineligible for
patent simply because it involves an abstract concept.”43 Accordingly, step two of
the test is designed to distinguish between patents that inappropriately monopolize
the “building blocks” of human ingenuity from those that “integrate the building
blocks into something more,”44 “thereby ‘transform[ing]’ them into a patent-eligible
invention.”45
In Alice, the Supreme Court rendered unpatentable a computer-implemented
scheme for mitigating settlement risk by using a third-party intermediary.46 The
Court explained that the claims were directed to “intermediated settlement,” which
is an abstract idea because it related to a fundamental economic practice of long
prevalence, similar to the hedging discussed in Bilski.47 In addition, the Court found
that the claims failed to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention
because the claims merely recited a generic implementation of an abstract idea on a
computer.48 Because the concept of intermediated settlement was a well-known and
long-standing fundamental practice, and because the claims only applied this wellknown concept on a computer, the Court found the asserted patent ineligible.49
In Mayo, the Court found ineligible under § 101 a patent directed to a process
to help doctors determine whether an applied dosage of a thiopurine drug to a patient
to treat autoimmune disease is too low or too high.50 People vary in how they
metabolize thiopurines, and it has been difficult for doctors to determine whether a
dose is too high, which could have harmful side effects, or too low, which could be
ineffective.51
At the time of invention, scientists were aware that a patient’s metabolites 6TG and 6-MMP were correlated with whether the patient’s dosage was too high or
low, but the precise correlations were unknown.52 The asserted patents related to the
researchers’ findings that identified these correlations.53 More specifically, the
claims at issue were directed to administering a thiopurine drug to a patient and
41

Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 71; see also Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216
(quoting with approval).
42
Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 71; see also Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217
(quoting with approval).
43
Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217 (citation omitted); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs.,
566 U.S. at 71–72.
44
Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217.
45
Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 82).
46
Id. at 212.
47
Id. at 218–21.
48
Id. at 221–26.
49
Id. at 224–26.
50
566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012).
51
Id. at 73.
52
Id. at 73–74.
53
Id. at 74.
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determining the concentration of 6-TG or 6-MMP metabolite in the patient’s blood,
wherein certain levels of either of these metabolites “indicates a need” to increase
or decrease “the amount of [thiopurine] drug subsequently administered” to the
patient.54 Put differently, the claims did not even require a doctor to change the
dosage, but were rather directed to the finding that levels of certain metabolite in a
patient’s bloodstream “indicates a need” to change the dosage.55
Under step one of the test, the Supreme Court found that the patents were
directed to laws of nature: the “relationships between concentrations of certain
metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will
prove ineffective or cause harm.”56 Because the patent “simply describes that
relation,” and because the “relation is a consequence of the ways in which thiopurine
compounds are metabolized by the body,” the patent simply “sets forth a natural
law.”57 Under step two of the test, although the claims included steps to administer
the thiopurine and determine the level of metabolite in the bloodstream, these
additional steps beyond the underlying natural law were merely “well-understood,
routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by scientists who work in the
field” and were thus insufficient to transform the claims into patent-eligible subject
matter.58
2. Application of the Two-step Test by Lower Courts
The Supreme Court has left district courts and the Federal Circuit to fend for
themselves since deciding Alice in 2014. The new test significantly impacted the
scope of available patent protection, and the Federal Circuit has found asserted
patents valid in less than 10% of its post-Alice decisions on patentable subject
matter.59 While a comprehensive overview of the Federal Circuit’s patentable
subject matter jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Article, this subpart briefly
discusses a few of the highlights.60
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.61 has had perhaps the most influence on step
one of the test for software claims. In Enfish, the Federal Circuit held that claims
54

Id. at 74–75 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 col. 20 ll. 10–20).
Id.
56
Id. at 77.
57
Id. (emphasis added).
58
Id. at 79.
59
Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the Law by Saying
Nothing?, 71 VAND. L. REV. 765, 765 (2018).
60
For recent patentable subject matter case briefs, see Mark A. Lemley et al., Recent
Developments in Patent Law (Spring 2017) 6–22 (Stan. Pub. L., Working Paper No.
2959553,
2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2959553
[https://perma.cc/VZ7R-8EEV]; Mark A. Lemley & Madeleine Laupheimer, Recent
Developments in Patent Law (Spring 2016) 5–10 (Stan. Pub. L., Working Paper No.
2778163,
2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2778163
[https://perma.cc/A3R6-3URW].
61
822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
55
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directed to a logical model for a computer database with a novel “self-referential”
property were patent-eligible.62 Unlike the traditional relational model, the selfreferential model can store all data types in a single table and can define the table’s
columns by its rows.63 The result: the self-referential model provides faster
searching and for more effective and flexible storage of data compared to the
traditional relational model.64
The court found that the patent claims were not directed to an abstract idea and
therefore passed step one of the test.65 It noted that “some improvements in
computer-related technology when appropriately claimed are undoubtedly not
abstract, such as a chip architecture, an LED display, and the like.”66 And
“[s]oftware can make non-abstract improvements to computer technology just as
hardware improvements can, and sometimes the improvements can be accomplished
through either route.”67 Thus, the court found it most “relevant to ask whether the
claims are directed to an improvement to computer functionality versus being
directed to an abstract idea.”68
The court found that the claims were not directed to an abstract idea because
“the plain focus of the claims is on an improvement to computer functionality itself,
not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary
capacity.”69 Moreover, “the claims are not simply directed to any form of storing
tabular data, but instead are specifically directed to a self-referential table for a
computer database.”70
The Federal Circuit has made very similar rulings on a memory system with
programmable operational characteristics that advantageously self-configure based
on the type of processor connected to the system,71 and on an improved virus
scanning approach that can proactively scan for potentially hostile operations, as
compared to prior art systems that can merely recognize the presence of previously
identified viruses.72 The court has also made somewhat analogous rulings on
unconventional computerized techniques, such as on an inertial tracking system
using inertial sensors in an unconventional configuration to track motion,73 and in
McRO on an automated method of synchronizing animated characters’ facial
expressions with sound (an improvement over the traditional and tedious manual
62

Id. at 1346.
Id. at 1340.
64
Id. at 1332.
65
Id. at 1336.
66
Id. at 1335.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 1336.
70
Id. at 1337.
71
Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1255–56, 1259–62 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
72
Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 679 F.3d 1299, 1304–06, No. 2016-2520, 2018
WL 341882, at *2–4 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 10, 2018).
73
Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
63
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method).74 This portion of the Federal Circuit precedent has been described by some
commentators as a “technological arts” test, broadly meaning that patents covering
software-based technological improvements to computer functionality are patent
eligible under step one of the test unlike non-technological disciplines that utilize
computers operating in their ordinary fashion.75
The Federal Circuit has made less headway on step two of the test but has twice
found claims eligible under step two. In Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc. v.
AT&T Mobility LLC,76 the Federal Circuit found patent-eligible claims directed to
using ISP servers to filter content while also providing individually customizable
filtering features, which gives the novel filtering tool the benefits of both of the
competing prior art filtering tools.77 The court found that the claims were directed to
the abstract idea of filtering content on the internet.78 But the ordered combination
of the claim limitations provided an inventive concept because, as described above,
the patent claims “a technology-based solution . . . to filter content on the Internet
that overcomes existing problems with other Internet filtering systems” and provides
the “advantages of [both prior art] filtering tools while avoiding their drawbacks.”79
The Federal Circuit in Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc. found
patent-eligible, under step two, a system “which allows network service providers
to account for and bill for [IP] network communications.”80 The court stressed that
the system utilized a distributed architecture that reduced “congestion in network
bottlenecks, while still allowing data to be accessible from a central location.”81 The
claimed system was patent-eligible under step two because the claim “entail[ed] an
unconventional technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a
technological problem (massive record flows which previously required massive
databases).”82

74

McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1303, 1306–07, 1316
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
75
See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 721 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J.,
concurring) (“A rule holding that claims are impermissibly abstract if they are directed to an
entrepreneurial objective, such as methods for increasing revenue, minimizing economic
risk, or structuring commercial transactions, rather than a technological one, would comport
with the guidance providing in both Alice and Bilski.”); Joshua L. Sohn, A Defense of the
Current Jurisprudence on Section 101, LAW 360 (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.law360.com/
articles/846930/a-defense-of-the-current-jurisprudence-on-section-101 [https://perma.cc/5E
AL-CRFA] (“[T]he Federal Circuit has consistently invalidated patent claims that simply
apply economic, business, or human-interaction practices on a computer without improving
the computer itself or any other technological art.”); see also Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra
note 59.
76
827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
77
Id. at 1343–44, 1350.
78
Id. at 1348–49.
79
Id. at 1344, 1351.
80
841 F.3d 1288, 1290–92 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
81
Id. at 1292.
82
Id. at 1300 (emphasis added).
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Together, Bascom and Amdocs generally stand for the proposition that patent
claims will survive step two if they implement a novel and unconventional technical
solution to a technological problem unsolved by prior art technologies.
B. Criticism of the New Two-step Test
Commentators on the new patentable subject matter doctrine generally fall into
one of three camps. The first includes those who believe the doctrine is a useful tool
to weed out bad patents quickly and inexpensively before parties must engage in
expensive discovery.83 The second camp includes those who believe that while the
patentable subject matter decisions may generally reach the correct result, other
patent law doctrines—such as novelty, nonobviousness, and written description—
better serve any policy objective that might be served by the new patentable subject
matter doctrine.84 While commentators in the first camp surely agree that the
patentable subject matter doctrine overlaps with other patentability doctrines,85
individuals in these two camps likely disagree most over whether other patentability
doctrines alone better serve those interests,86 or whether other patentability doctrines
could advantageously be decided in some instances at the pleadings stage before
83

See, e.g., John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89
TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1058 (2011); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106
GEO. L.J. 619, 650–62 (2018).
84
It can be difficult to distinguish between commentators in camp two (who think
patentable subject matter is the wrong tool but generally reaches the right outcome) from
those in camp three (who think patentable subject matter is the wrong tool that often reaches
the wrong outcome). However, commentators who criticize the doctrine under one of these
grounds are not hard to find. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Applying Patent-Eligible Subject
Matter Restrictions, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 267, 281 (2015); Dmitry Karshtedt,
Photocopies, Patents, and Knowledge Transfer: “The Uneasy Case” of Justice Breyer’s
Patentable Subject Matter Jurisprudence, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1739, 1776–82 (2016); Brief of
Professors Jeffery A. Lefstin and Peter S. Menells as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari at 23, Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016)
(No. 15-1182); Risch, supra note 6, at 45; Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 9, at 941–42;
Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 650–51 (2008); Taylor,
supra note 8, at 2152 (“I address whether the existing statutory patentability and specification
requirements sufficiently address the relevant concerns raised by the Supreme Court in its
cases addressing eligibility. Ultimately, I conclude that the other patentability and
specification requirements already do, without amendment, address those concerns.”); David
O. Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN. L. REV. 157, 159–60 (2016); Vyas, supra
note 10, at 2–3.
85
See Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 59, at 777 (“Aspects of the patentable subject
matter inquiry indisputably overlap with other patentability requirements.”); see also Lemley
et al., supra note 20, at 1329–32; Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Patent-Eligible
Processes: An Audience Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 349, 377 (2015); John M.
Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 701–03 (2016)
(explaining the benefits of legal redundancy).
86
See generally Golden, supra note 83; Gugliuzza, supra note 83.
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parties must engage in expensive discovery.87 Commentators in the third camp
believe that the current doctrine is far too patent-unfriendly and encourages judges
to make important decisions on an insufficient record.88
But many commentators from all three camps believe that the new two-step test
is ambiguous and unpredictable. As sampled in the introduction,89 scholars have
been quite colorful in their descriptions of the rule’s ambiguity.90
There are certainly reasons the test could be difficult to administer. For one, the
test first asks whether the claims are directed to an “abstract idea,” which might be
difficult to ascertain because, as admitted by the Supreme Court in Mayo and Alice,91
all claims are directed to an abstract idea on some level.92 The Alice Court provided
no guidance on this step, merely stating that “we need not labor to delimit the precise
contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this case.”93 The second step is also a bit
of a judgment call just like many other patent eligibility doctrines like obviousness,
considering virtually all claims will offer something beyond the abstract idea itself.
However, the Federal Circuit has provided some guidance on step one at least in
cases like Enfish,94 and on step two at least in cases like Bascom.95
The literature is devoid of any empirical support for the popular belief that the
Supreme Court’s new two-step test is overly ambiguous. This Article aims to fill
that void.

87

See Gugliuzza, supra note 83, at 640–41.
Scholars in this camp can sometimes be hard to distinguish from scholars in the
second camp. See supra note 84.
89
See supra notes 6–14.
90
See also Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “An Unpatentable
Abstract Idea,” 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 37, 41 (2011) (describing the “abstract idea”
concept as “multiply ambiguous”); John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says
Another: A Need for Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1765, 1770 (2014) (“Since the Supreme Court issued its Bilski decision in 2010, the
law of subject-matter eligibility has plunged into a seemingly ever widening maelstrom of
uncertainty.”); Christopher M. Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad: A Reinvigorated
Judicial Wildcard of Uncertain Effect, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1796, 1798 (2014)
(“Unfortunately, the Court has provided little guidance with respect to the readjusted
contours of the newly invigorated doctrine, and as a consequence, judges and the PTO have
been thrown into a state of confusion with respect to the proper application of the doctrine;
the high degree of uncertainty is even more problematic for patent attorneys and their
clients.”).
91
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012);
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014) (quoting with approval).
92
See Collins, supra note 90, at 39–40; Risch, supra note 6, at 53; Tun-Jen Chiang, The
Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1353, 1369–71 (2010).
93
Alice Corp., 273 U.S. at 221.
94
See supra notes 61–75 and accompanying text.
95
See supra notes 76–82 and accompanying text.
88
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II. EMPIRICAL TEST
This Article provides the results of an empirical study testing the clarity of the
new two-step test in the software field. In particular, 231 patent attorneys were
provided five software patent claims randomly selected from a population of fifty
and were asked to predict how courts would rule regarding subject matter
eligibility.96 This Part explains how the populations of attorneys and claims were
selected.
A. Population of Attorneys
The population of attorneys included all attorneys uncovered through a search
for patent attorneys on the websites of each of the twenty-five law firms listed in the
2017 Vault Best Law Firms for Intellectual Property.97 The law firms listed in Vault
are believed to have a robust and thriving intellectual property practice. Moreover,
I do not believe patent attorneys at these law firms are inherently better or worse
predictors than patent attorneys at other law firms.
One potential bias in the sample is that the listed firms tend to engage in more
patent litigation defense work than plaintiff work. Over the last decade, nonpracticing entities have represented an increasingly larger percentage of patent
plaintiffs, approaching 40% in recent years.98 This number appears to be even higher
in high-tech cases.99 The surveyed firms listed in Vault tend to represent mostly
operating companies, and therefore they tend to defend patent lawsuits more often
than bring them (and, therefore, they tend to argue patents are patent ineligible). For
this reason, the patent litigators surveyed may have a patent ineligibility bias
because that is the position they most often take in court.100
The patent prosecutors surveyed, on the other hand, may have the opposite bias,
because they are in the business of obtaining patent protection for inventions, not
arguing for invalidity. In addition, they generally deal with the USPTO rather than
with courts, and the USPTO has a reputation for being quite lenient in granting
patents.101 Because there are reasons to think patent litigators and patent prosecutors
96

For a link to take the test yourself, see supra note 15.
2017 Best Law Firms for Intellectual Property, VAULT, http://www.vault.com/comp
any-rankings/law/best-law-firms-in-each-practice-area/?sRankID=20&rYear=2017&pg=2
[https://perma.cc/677P-MNWY].
98
See Sara Jeruss et al., The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization
Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 388 (2012); 2016 Annual Patent
Dispute Report, UNIFIED PATENTS, https://www.unifiedpatents.com/news/2016/12/28/2016annual-patent-dispute-report [https://perma.cc/5DPJ-A9AC].
99
See 2016 Annual Patent Dispute Report, supra note 98.
100
See Zev J. Eigen & Yair Listokin, Do Lawyers Really Believe Their Own Hype, and
Should They? A Natural Experiment, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 239 (2012) (finding that “following
participation in moot court contests, students overwhelmingly perceive that the legal merits
favor the side that they were randomly assigned to represent”).
101
See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
97
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may have different perspectives on the patentability of the claims, the background
portion of the survey asked attorneys to list their primary area of practice (litigation,
prosecution, transactions, or other) so that both litigators and prosecutors could be
analyzed separately.
The patent attorneys for each of the 2017 Vault Twenty-Five Best Law Firms
for Intellectual Property were obtained by going to each firm’s website in May of
2017 and using some combination of filters and keyword searches to obtain the best
estimate of patent attorneys within each firm. The survey was ultimately sent to
3,725 attorneys, of whom 231 responded to the survey for a 6.2% response rate.102
Emails were sent out to the attorneys in batches between late May and early
June of 2017. A reminder email was sent to each group around two days after the
first email was sent.
B. Population of Claims
The population of fifty software claims was obtained from district court
patentable subject matter pleading-stage decisions issued between the Federal
Circuit’s McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc.103 decision on
September 13, 2016 and April 19, 2017 when case collection began (a total time
frame of just over seven months). The survey included only very recent decisions
by design: it is most desirable to know whether the doctrine is currently ambiguous,
not whether the doctrine was ambiguous in the recent aftermath of Alice. It is
advantageous that case collection included only cases arising after McRO because
(1) McRO is one of the rare cases in which the Federal Circuit found a patent subject
matter eligible, and thus the case may have a meaningful effect on the law; and (2)
at that point sufficient cases had been collected.104

1495 (2001); see also John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the
Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (suggesting that nearly half of
the patents eventually litigated to judgment are held invalid); Julie E. Cohen, Reverse
Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of
“Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1177–79 (1995); Robert P. Merges, As
Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts
and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 589–90 (1999); John R. Thomas,
Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 316–22.
102
The initial email list included 3,848 emails. However, during the sending process,
twenty-two emails were received notifying me that the attorney no longer worked for the
firm, and an additional email was received from a kind attorney at Jones Day who informed
me that he didn’t work in patent law and that I should exclude him from the response rate
calculation. Furthermore, 100 individuals (2.6% of the population) were sent an original pilot
version of the survey, but these individuals are not counted because the survey underwent
significant revision before being sent to the remainder of the respondents.
103
837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
104
For example, to determine whether all cases are approximately equally hard, it helps
to have a reasonable number of predictions for each claim.
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To arrive at the population of software claims, I conducted a Westlaw search
around April 19, 2017 for all cases that cited either Alice or Mayo. It seems highly
unlikely that a patentable subject matter ruling on a software claim would not cite to
at least one of these two cases, considering they are the two cases handed down by
the Supreme Court that articulate the new two-step test.
For each case that issued a software-related subject matter eligibility ruling, the
patents at issue and representative claims were reviewed, as well as the ultimate
ruling on each patent. But not all representative claims for which there was a ruling
were included in the final population of claims. Because rulings on different patents
in the same lawsuit may not be wholly independent,105 in general only one claim per
case was included in the final population of claims. If the opinion focused on a
representative claim from one of the patents in particular, that claim was chosen for
the dataset. If not, then one of the claims was randomly selected from the group of
representative claims examined by the court.
The only circumstances in which more than one claim was chosen from a
particular case was where the court clearly bundled up the patents at issue into
multiple distinct groups. In these cases, the court often, though not always, found
some groups of asserted claims eligible and other groups ineligible.
At least one claim was taken from every uncovered pleading-stage opinion that
issued a § 101 subject matter eligibility ruling on a software patent, except a claim
was not included from the internet gambling patent infringement cases brought by
CG Technology Development, LLC for various reasons. Two CG Technology
opinions fell within the date-range of the study. For one of these cases, the plaintiffs
did not even present arguments on eligibility and instead simply “preserve[d] their
right to appeal.”106 For the other case, it was unclear to what extent the court was
truly making a patentability ruling separate from its prior decisions in earlier cases
that fell outside of the relevant date range.107 Based on the results discussed in Part
III, because the court found all the disputed claims in these excluded opinions to be
ineligible (and because these claims are clearly directed to an application of
computers to gambling) if anything, including one of these claims in the population
would have likely only slightly increased the percentage of correct predictions.
Because few attorneys billing their time at hundreds of dollars per hour would
be willing to take a lengthy survey, to keep the survey as concise as possible and to
ensure that all attorneys use roughly the same information in making their decisions,
the attorneys were only given the claims to review in making their patentability
decisions. Accordingly, attorneys were not given other highly relevant information,
such as a given patent’s specification. Had the specification been given to the
105

See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 245 (1998); John R. Allison et al., Understanding the
Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1796 (2014).
106
CG Tech. Dev., LLC v. FanDuel, Inc., No. 16-CV-801, 2017 WL 58572, at *5 (D.
Nev. Jan. 4, 2017).
107
See CG Tech. Dev., LLC v. DraftKings, Inc., No. 16-CV-781, 2016 WL 7190547
(D. Nev. Dec. 12, 2016); CG Tech. Dev., LLC v. Bwin.Party (USA), Inc., No. 16-CV-00871,
2016 WL 6089696 (D. Nev. Oct. 18, 2016).
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attorneys, I believe many of the attorneys would not have taken the extra time to
look at it. Because the attorneys were reviewing the cases on a limited record, only
pleading stage decisions were included in the experiment. That way, the records on
which those cases were decided would be closer to what the attorneys received as
compared to the excluded cases that were decided after discovery and claim
construction.
The resulting list included sixty-two distinct claims.108 For eight of these sixtytwo claims, however, the court simply concluded that it was premature to render the
claims ineligible at the motion to dismiss stage. Although these claims were
ultimately included in the population of claims sent to the attorneys, they were not
ultimately included in the detailed analysis provided in Part III. These claims were
not included in the final analysis for three reasons: (1) most importantly, because it
is unclear how courts will ultimately rule on these claims; (2) the attorneys were
asked whether a court would ultimately find the claims patent-eligible or patentineligible, not whether the claims would survive a motion to dismiss; and (3) it is
unlikely the attorneys could make an educated prediction on even less information
than was before the court if the court believed that it needed more information before
rendering a decision.109 The rest of the Article will only provide results pertaining to
claims for which the courts provided a more definitive ruling.
In addition, four of the sixty-two cases were heard by the Federal Circuit. The
claims in these cases were included in the population of claims sent to the patent
attorneys; however, these claims are not included in the final analysis discussed in
Part III. These claims were ultimately excluded because they come from cases about
which responding attorneys were most likely to have had prior knowledge. If the
responding attorneys were familiar with the specific Federal Circuit decisions, they
might have recognized the claims and made an eligibility decision based on their
familiarity with the actual case. Importantly, every piece of analysis in Part III was
conducted with and without the Federal Circuit cases included, and it was
determined that the results provided in Part III would have been the same even if the
Federal Circuit cases were included in the analysis. Interestingly, the responding
attorneys were actually slightly worse at predicting on the Federal Circuit cases than
on the district court cases, though this result was neither statistically significant nor
significant enough to affect any of the results provided in Part III.
Because each of the 231 responding attorneys made five predictions, the
resulting study includes 1,155 predictions, 952 of which were on the fifty claims
relevant to the results discussed throughout the rest of the Article (as stated
previously, these 952 data points are used for all the conclusions made in Part III).
108

The claim population is on file with the author.
As will be discussed in more detail below, the attorneys ultimately predicted eligible
25% of the time on the ineligible claims and 47% of the time on the eligible claims. They
predicted eligible 35.7% of the time on the claims for which the district courts determined it
was premature to render the claims ineligible at the motion to dismiss stage. This 35.7%
result is right in between the 25% result for the ineligible claims and the 47% result on the
eligible claims, which makes sense because the courts will likely ultimately find some of the
claims for which it reserved judgment to be eligible and others ineligible.
109
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III. RESULTS
The results suggest that while the new two-step test is most certainly not a
beacon of clarity, it is also not completely ambiguous. But this conclusion is not
apparent at first glance. As a whole, the 231 attorneys surveyed agreed with the
courts 63% of the time as to the eligibility of the claims. This number alone leaves
much to be desired. For one, the attorneys would have agreed with the courts roughly
50% of the time just by flipping a coin to decide each case (or some other form of
guessing). Courts found 56% of the claims ineligible, though patent attorneys
predicted the claims to be patent-ineligible 65% of the time. Had the attorneys
simply randomly predicted patent-ineligible 65% of the time on the claims, they
would have correctly identified court outcomes 51.8% of the time.110
The rest of this Part will show why the results are somewhat more promising
than at first glance. Importantly, the data can only be lumped and analyzed together
as done above if each data point is sufficiently similar. If not, then the data is more
appropriately analyzed after being broken down. For example, a hypothetical study
showing that the average height of the human population is 5’ 7’’ could inaccurately
imply that this average is uniform across both men and women, where in fact this
average applies to neither sex. A better way to convey the information from the study
would be that the average height is 5’ 4’’ for females and 5’ 10’’ for males.111
For this empirical study, any two data points can differ (1) by the attorney
making the prediction, and (2) by the claim being predicted. Thus, the data points
can only be appropriately lumped together if attorneys are approximately equally
skilled predictors and if the claims are all approximately equally difficult to
predict.112
Part III.A shows that all attorneys are not equally good predictors, and Part III.B
illustrates that some claims are more difficult to predict than others. Parts III.A and
III.B together show that the data is not accurately and precisely represented as a
single unit by the 63% figure above. Part III.C reanalyzes the data in light of these
findings and demonstrates that the new two-step test may not be as ambiguous as
many commentators have suggested. Part III.D provides insight regarding whether
patent attorneys tended to agree with one another about the eligibility of the claims
more than with the courts.

110

For the 56% of cases courts found ineligible, attorneys would get those cases correct
65% of the time. For the other 44% of the cases, attorneys would get those right 35% of the
time. (56)*(.65)+(44)*(.35) = 51.8%.
111
These averages were made up for illustration and are not based on any actual data.
112
In more statistical terms, the data should only be lumped together if the data fits the
binomial distribution. See, e.g., The Binomial Distribution, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME,
https://www3.nd.edu/~rwilliam/stats1/x13.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ9Z-ZTR8] (last visited
Nov. 6, 2018); Wayne W. LaMorte, The Binomial Distribution: A Probability Model for a
Discrete Outcome, B.U. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH (July 24, 2016), http://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/
otlt/MPH-Modules/BS/BS704_Probability/BS704_Probability7.html [https://perma.cc/T5N
G-5MVD].
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A. Are All Predictors Equally Good?
To be clear, just because some of the 231 attorneys correctly predicted court
outcomes on a greater percentage of cases than other attorneys does not mean that
some groups of attorneys are better predictors. Indeed, if someone flips 231 different
quarters 5 times each and records the number of heads flipped for each coin, the
number of heads will clearly not be the same for each quarter, even though the
quarters all have the same probability of turning up heads. The differences in the
outcomes for the quarters is attributable to chance alone. What matters is whether
the differences in the number of claims each attorney correctly predicted is
attributable to chance alone (like with the quarters), or whether the differences are
also attributable to the fact that some groups of attorneys are better predictors.
As it turns out, attorneys aren’t quarters.113 The attorneys’ distribution of scores
was much wider than what could be expected due to chance alone, which means that
some groups of attorneys were much better predictors than others.114 For this reason
alone, the 63% value is an inappropriate measure of attorney performance. Just like
the 5’ 7’’ average human height is an unrepresentative metric for both men and
women in the hypothetical above (the average being 5’ 10’’ for men and 5’ 4’’ for
women in the example), the 63% value turns out to be an unrepresentative metric
for the attorneys.
So which kinds of attorneys are the best predictors? Unfortunately, because
asking attorneys to make predictions on five claims was already asking a lot, the
attorneys were asked only a few background questions to keep the survey as
manageable as possible. Nonetheless, the following information was acquired:
number of years of legal experience (0–2; 3–5; 6–9; 10+), percentage of time spent
on patent law (0–25%; 25–50%; 50–75%; 75%–100%), the attorney’s primary area
of practice (litigation; prosecution; transactions; other), the attorney’s subjective
evaluation of his or her familiarity with the two-step test (extremely familiar; very
familiar; moderately familiar; slightly familiar; not familiar at all), and familiarity
with different technological areas (such as software).
113

Either literally or with respect to their relative abilities to correctly predict patent
eligibility.
114
The MATLAB code used to make this determination is on file with the author. This
determination was made more difficult due to the fact that the attorneys received five claims
randomly selected from a population of sixty-two, but this analysis is only relevant for the
fifty claims for which district courts made a more definitive ruling. That means that not all
attorneys received five claims that are of interest in this analysis (because some received at
least one of the eight claims for which the courts made a less-than-definitive ruling). To deal
with this complication, I first determined how many relevant claims each attorney predicted.
Then I ran 10,000 trials simulating the results of a random binomial draw and calculated the
variance of the results for each trial. Finally, I checked to see if the actual variance was in
the statistically significant range of the 10,000 binomial trials. None of the 10,000 trials
produced a variance even close to as large as the variance received from the actual data,
which shows that the differences in outcomes across attorneys cannot be entirely attributable
to chance.
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Because virtually all the attorneys surveyed indicated that they spent most of
their time on patent law, that metric could not be used to differentiate the attorneys.
In addition, only insignificant differences were found for the attorneys based on
years of legal experience and their subjective evaluations of their familiarity with
the two-step test. The latter finding is not that surprising, considering attorneys’
subjective self-evaluations may not be that accurate.115
By far the biggest differentiator in predictor accuracy was primary area of
practice (litigation vs. prosecution). Patent prosecutors correctly predicted court
outcomes 67.3% of the time, while patent litigators correctly predicted court
outcomes only 59.7% of the time.116
The hypothesis that all patent prosecutors surveyed are approximately equally
skilled predictors could not be rejected, though this could be because the differences
are too small to detect with a sample size of ninety-seven patent prosecutors.117 The
results for the 128 litigators, however, were too widely dispersed to be attributable
to chance alone.118 Accordingly, some litigators are better than 59.7% at predicting
court outcomes, and some are worse.
Because litigators familiar with software unsurprisingly fared better than
litigators unfamiliar with software (61.3% correct vs. 54.8% correct), the wide
disparity in litigators’ predicting abilities might be because the litigators familiar and
unfamiliar with software constitute two distinct groups. However, this finding was
not statistically significant, which is unsurprising because filtering out all the
responding prosecutors and splitting the population of litigators into two produced
two comparatively small samples from which to draw conclusions. Interestingly,
splitting up the prosecutors into those familiar and unfamiliar with software
produced less than a 3% difference.
This finding is surprising. It seems hard to believe that familiarity with the
subject matter of the claims would not improve predicting ability. I believe that the
benefit to being familiar with software would manifest more strongly if the attorneys
took a more thorough look at the claims and had access to other relevant information
such as the patent specification. Regarding the former, as stated previously most
respondents spent less than a minute analyzing each claim. My guess is that, had
they spent more time analyzing the claim and other relevant information, any
expertise would begin to show. If this theory is right, the predicting abilities of the
115

David Dunning et al., Flawed Self-Assessment: Implications for Health, Education,
and the Workplace, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 69, 90–92 (2004), https://pdfs.semanticscho
lar.org/bed3/59015324e4e105e95cce895cc79cae2bc2e7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M4T4VQDX].
116
The difference between these two population proportions is statistically significant
when representing both populations as binomial distributions (p=0.01596). However, as will
be discussed in the next paragraph, the litigators do not fit the binomial distribution, which
means that patent prosecutors may not be better predictors than all groups of litigators.
117
To make this determination, the same analysis was conducted as described in note
114, but only with the data received from patent prosecutors.
118
Again, the same analysis described in note 114 was used, but only with the litigator
data.
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attorneys knowledgeable about software would likely measurably increase if they
were able to conduct a more thorough investigation.
To sum up, the surveyed patent prosecutors were better at predicting court
outcomes than patent litigators. However, patent litigators varied significantly in
their predictive abilities—much more than what can be attributable to chance
alone—and thus some groups of patent litigators might fare similarly to the patent
prosecutors.
Why do prosecutors seem to be better predictors than at least some groups of
litigators? Unfortunately, no conclusive answer can be given, but I have some
theories. For one, patent prosecutors are more likely to have a technical background
and thus may be better suited to quickly interpreting complex patent claims as was
done for the survey. Second, patent prosecutors often need to make quick decisions
about patentability as a part of their job, while patent litigators often have a lot of
time to formulate their patentability arguments. Third, patent prosecutors deal with
patent eligibility questions all the time, whether they are attempting to draft patenteligible claims, conducting patentability analysis, conducting freedom-to-operate
investigations, or drafting invalidity opinions. In other words, patent prosecutors are
always dealing with validity and examining numerous patents on a day-to-day basis.
By contrast, litigators are often staffed on only a few cases at a time, and patent
validity analysis will only comprise one small job of many that litigators perform.
Although patent litigators fared more poorly, I am not convinced that patent
prosecutors are inherently better than litigators at applying the two-step test. I think
the more accurate inference is that litigators are worse than prosecutors at making
quick eligibility decisions, as was done by the attorneys on the survey. Litigators are
less likely to have a technical background and thus may require a little more time to
fully understand the technology and claims. And unlike litigators, prosecutors must
often make quick eligibility decisions. For these reasons, I believe the discrepancy
between litigators and prosecutors would be reduced or eliminated if the attorneys
spent more time on their decisions and had access to more information. If this
inference is correct, then I think it’s a mistake to read too much into the litigators’
poor performance—they just needed more time and information.
Due to the differences shown in this part between patent prosecutors’ and patent
litigators’ predictive abilities, for the rest of the Article, the data for these two groups
will generally be analyzed separately.
B. Are All Claims Equally Hard?
Chance does not even come close to explaining the varying degrees of success
attorneys had at predicting the eligibility of the claims.119 This heterogeneity implies
one or both of the following: (1) the predictors were biased for some reason, such as
for lacking certain relevant information; and/or (2) the two-step test is much easier
119

The MATLAB code used to make this determination is on file with the author. A
similar analysis was conducted for the claims as was done for the attorneys. See supra note
114.
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to apply for some groups of claims than for other groups of claims. So, which claims
are the most difficult to predict, and why?
Attorneys were much better at predicting which claims were eligible—and
worse at predicting which claims were ineligible—as the patent claim’s priority date
became more recent. In addition, attorneys predicted that claims were patent-eligible
more often as the patent claim’s priority date became more recent. These results
suggest, among other things, that attorneys would have been much more successful
predictors had they been given priority date information. These results are somewhat
unsurprising, considering the two-step test often turns on whether the patent claims
are directed to conventional and well-known techniques, which changes with time.
Indeed, the attorneys would be much more likely to read the patents with the earlier
priority dates as being directed to conventional and well-known technology.
To illustrate this finding, the claims were divided into two groups: a group
consisting of the twenty-five patents with the earliest priority dates (older group)
and a group consisting of the other twenty-five patents with the most recent priority
dates (newer group). Twelve of twenty-five claims were deemed eligible by courts
in the older group, and ten of twenty-five in the newer group. The older group
included one patent with a priority date of 1981 and twenty-four additional patents
with priority dates ranging between 1992 and 2001. The priority dates for the newer
group ranged from 2001 to 2014.
Patent prosecutors correctly predicted court outcomes more often for the older
group than for the newer group (72.8% vs. 61.2%).120 For the older group of claims,
patent prosecutors correctly identified patent-ineligible claims 87.2% of the time,
but they only correctly identified patent-ineligible claims 56.3% of the time on the
newer group of claims (this difference is highly statistically significant).121
Conversely, patent prosecutors correctly identified patent-eligible claims only
41.2% of the time for the older group of claims but 65.1% of the time for the newer
group of claims (again, this difference is highly statistically significant).122
Patent prosecutors predicted patent-eligible over twice as often on the newer
group than the older group (55.6% of the time vs. 21.7% of the time).123 Thus, patent
prosecutors were ineligibility biased for the older group (52% of the claims were
found patent-ineligible by courts but patent prosecutors predicted patent-ineligible
78.3% of the time), but prosecutors were eligibility biased for the newer group (40%
of the claims were found patent-eligible by courts but patent prosecutors predicted
patent-eligible 55.6% of the time). These biases exist presumably because, as
described above, the older group of claims are based on older technology that may
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This finding is statistically significant (p=0.012).
Again, estimating the populations with the binomial distribution, p<0.0001.
122
Again, estimating the population with the binomial distribution, p=0.006.
123
Again, estimating the population with the binomial distribution, this finding is
statistically significant (p<0.0002).
121
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seem more conventional and well-known to the attorneys absent knowledge of the
patent’s priority date. These findings suggest that, had prosecutors been given the
representative claim’s priority date, they likely would have done a better job on their
predictions.
Similar results were obtained for the patent litigators. Litigators were no better
at predicting court outcomes for either group of claims (58.9% vs. 60.4%). Litigators
correctly identified the patent-ineligible claims 79% of the time for the older group
of claims but only 68.5% of the time for the newer group.124 Conversely, they
correctly identified patent-eligible claims only 35% of the time for the older group
but 49.5% of the time for the newer group.125 Litigators predicted patent-eligible
claims much more often for the newer group than for the older group (39.2% vs.
27.4%), presumably for the same reasons as the prosecutors. Interestingly, although
litigators were ineligibility-biased for the older group, they were not eligibilitybiased in either direction for the newer group (they predicted patent-eligible 39.2%
of the time on the claims in the newer group, and 40% of the newer group claims
were found patent-eligible by courts).
While I believe these results are most likely attributable to the fact that older
technologies are more likely to seem conventional and well-known absent context
about the invention date, yet another possible reason is that claims written nearer to
the present may have been written with patentable subject matter concerns in mind
and therefore appear more eligible absent additional context. Cutting against this
theory is that the newer claims did not appear more patent-eligible to the courts—as
stated above, the courts found more claims patent-eligible in the older group than
the newer group. However, it is at least possible that the newer claims themselves
were written with the new two-step test in mind and therefore at least appear more
patent-eligible absent additional context. While this theory seems less probative to
me, importantly, this theory is still consistent with the fact that the attorneys may
have performed better if they spent more time and had more information.126
Whatever the case, patent priority date does not itself explain the varying
degrees of success the attorneys had at predicting the eligibility of the claims.127
Indeed, even after splitting the claims into the two groups described above, the
varying degrees of success the attorneys had on the claims could not be explained
by chance alone. Although additional reasons for the disparity were not uncovered,
124

Again, estimating the population with the binomial distribution, p=0.042.
Again, estimating the population with the binomial distribution, p=0.0026.
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I attempted to test this theory by breaking up the claims into two groups by issue
date (as opposed to priority date), because patent claims can be amended essentially up until
the patent issues. However, because issue date and priority date generally closely track oneanother, the older and newer priority date groups ended up too similar to the older and newer
issue date groups to make any definitive conclusions.
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This was determined by breaking up the claims yet again into four groups and testing
to see if chance alone could explain the differences in outcomes for each of the claims, as
was discussed supra note 114. The four groups were the following: (1) patent prosecutors,
first group; (2) patent prosecutors, second group; (3) patent litigators, first group; and (4)
patent litigators, second group.
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I believe that it’s likely that application of the two-step eligibility test is easier for
some groups of claims than for others.
C. Is the Patentable Subject Matter Test Overly Ambiguous?
While the Supreme Court’s new two-step test is not crystal clear, it is not
completely nebulous either. For example, patent prosecutors correctly identified
how courts ruled 67.3% of the time. Patent litigators fared much worse, correctly
identifying how courts ruled only 59.7% of the time. Interestingly, patent litigators
varied significantly in their predictive abilities—much more than due to chance
alone. Thus, some groups of litigators are much better at predicting than the 59.7%
value would suggest, and some groups of patent litigators are even worse than 59.7%
at predicting court outcomes. Furthermore, patent prosecutors were over 1.7 times
more likely to predict patent-ineligible on claims that courts found patent-ineligible
than on claims courts found patent-eligible. These results are more impressive than
they sound, considering (1) attorneys were only provided with the patent claim and
were not given other highly relevant information such as the patent specification,
priority date, and prior art; (2) more than 57% of respondents spent an average of
less than one minute analyzing each claim; (3) the doctrine is still new and may
become clearer in the coming years;128 and (4) the attorneys displayed various
eligibility-and-ineligibility biases (depending on attorney type and priority date) that
hindered their abilities to make correct predictions.
As explained above, the results show that attorneys would have been better
predictors had they been given priority date information. Many attorneys also
indicated in their comments that they subjectively believed that they would have
been much better predictors had they been able to review the specification and
review the prior art. I stand by my decision not to include the specification, however,
because it is unlikely many attorneys would have taken the time to look at it, and it
would have been equally difficult to know how closely any given attorney reviewed
the specification as well. It also would have been more difficult to collect responses,
because some attorneys likely would have been dissuaded from completing the more
intense survey. In any event, the attorneys likely would have improved had they
spent more time on each claim and reviewed more relevant information.
Patent priority date alone did not explain the varying degrees of success
attorneys had at predicting the eligibility of the claims. This finding suggests that
the two-step test might be easier to administer for some claims than for others (or
that there are other fixable biases due to lack of time and information). Aside from
priority date, the reasons for why some groups of claims are easier than others were
not uncovered; however, the finding suggests that courts are developing rules that
are easier to apply to some claims than to others.
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See Keith N. Hylton, Patent Uncertainty: Toward a Framework with Applications,
96 B.U. L. REV. 1117, 1148 (2016) (stating that common law doctrines like patentable subject
matter can often be difficult to apply in the early stages of litigation).
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Although patent litigators performed rather poorly, it may be a mistake to read
too much into the litigators’ poor performance. It seems reasonable to believe that,
rather than being inherently worse than prosecutors at applying the two-step test,
patent litigators are simply worse at making quick eligibility decisions as was done
on the survey. If this is the case, then the litigators would have performed
comparatively much better had they spent more time on their decisions and had
access to more information.
For these reasons, the results show that the two-step test is not wholly
ambiguous or as impossible to administer as a few (though perhaps not all)
commentators have suggested. If patent prosecutors can correctly predict court
outcomes over two-thirds of the time after spending less than one minute analyzing
merely one piece of the puzzle, the two-step test is not impossible to administer
coherently.
However, I leave it to the readers to decide for themselves whether they believe
the two-part test is too ambiguous as many have suggested. This Article does not
take a stance on whether the two-step test is sufficiently clear to be good patent
policy for two reasons. First, the survey presented here provides only a lower bound
for the clarity of the new two-step test because it would be difficult if not impossible
for attorneys to predict §101 outcomes in less time or with less information.
Although the results suggest that the attorneys’ predictions would have greatly
improved had they had access to even the patent’s priority date, and although some
attorneys subjectively believed that they would have performed much better had
they been able to review the specification, more research is necessary to determine
just how much better attorneys would have improved by spending more time and
reviewing more information.
Second, this Article takes no stance on how much certainty is “enough”
certainty. Commentators will surely disagree on how much certainty is sufficient,
and the purpose of this empirical test was not to make this determination.
This Article also does not take a stance on whether the current test is socially
optimal as a matter of public policy, or on whether certain tweaks to the test could
serve the same policy goals while also improving the rule’s clarity.129 This Article
does, however, take a crucial first step in showing that the current two-step test is
clearly not as ambiguous as its most vehement critics suggest.
D. Other Important Findings
One other important finding should be noted. Attorneys agreed with oneanother 62% of the time, which is roughly equal to their 63% agreement with the
129

See generally Risch, supra note 84, at 591 (recommending that confusing
jurisprudence regarding patentable subject matter “can be clarified by implementing a single
rule: any invention that satisfies the Patent Act’s requirements of category, utility, novelty,
nonobviousness, and specification is patentable.”); Risch, supra note 6, at 45 (advocating
for the idea that all claims for “application of abstract ideas and laws of nature” should be
“eligible, and allow the remaining patentability rules to weed out underserving patent
applications.”).
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courts.130 This finding holds if the attorneys are broken down into prosecutors and
litigators as well.131 This implies that district courts may not be misapplying the twostep test due to lack of patent expertise. One reason to hesitate in making this
conclusion, however, is that over 57% of the attorneys spent much less than one
minute analyzing each claim, and it’s unclear whether this result would hold if patent
attorneys spent more time on each case. It is possible, for example, that as attorneys
spend more time on the claims, their expertise would play a stronger role in their
decisions, and thus they would tend to agree with each other comparatively more
often than with the courts.
The results also suggest that attorneys might be more worried about Alice’s
scope than they should be. Patent litigators were particularly ineligibility biased for
claims with older priority dates but were not eligibility biased on the claims with
more recent priority dates. Patent prosecutors were ineligibility biased for the older
group of claims but eligibility biased for the newer group of claims. Viewing the
claims as a whole, however, both types of attorneys are ineligibility biased. This
finding suggests that attorneys may be overestimating the effects of Alice.
Furthermore, the results strongly suggest that patent attorneys were not
correctly identifying claims to any meaningful degree due to outside knowledge of
any of the claims or cases in the dataset. For one, patent prosecutors outperformed
patent litigators, even though patent prosecutors are much less likely to have any
direct knowledge of the cases in the dataset. Patent prosecutors generally have little,
if any, contact with the vast majority of district court cases. Second, the respondents
actually performed a bit better on the fifty district court cases (63%) than on the four
Federal Circuit cases (59.7%). Because the attorneys are much more likely to know
about the Federal Circuit cases than the district court cases, if attorneys were basing
their decisions on prior knowledge, one would expect them to perform much better
on the Federal Circuit cases than on the district court cases. Third, the variance in
performance discussed above, such as the variance based on priority date and claim
eligibility, bear no relation to the ability to obtain outside knowledge about the case
at-issue.
One final point: the reinvigorated patentable subject matter doctrine is still new
and in flux. As the doctrine continues to change, so will its degree of clarity.
Accordingly, as the patentable subject matter doctrine evolves, it may become more
or less ambiguous than suggested by this study, which was limited to cases decided
between September 13, 2016 and April 19, 2017.
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This determination was made by calculating the inter-rater agreement. See Raw
Agreement
Indices,
JOHN-UEBERSAX.COM,
http://john-uebersax.com/stat/raw.htm
[https://perma.cc/G48C-E99M] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018).
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Prosecutors agreed with courts 67% of the time and agreed with one another 67.2%
of the time. Litigators agreed with courts 59.5% of the time and with each other 58.3% of
the time.
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CONCLUSION
This Article shows that the new two-step patent-eligibility test is not as unadministrable as at least its most ardent critics have suggested. More research is
necessary to ascertain how much better the attorneys would have predicted court
outcomes had they spent more time on their predictions and had access to more
information.

